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1. Social law as a test case 
Current discussions originated by the crisis place social law at the 
crossroad of other critical evaluations and proposals. This paper looks at 
how in the wake of the crisis EU legal methods related to employment 
and social policies are undergoing changes. Following a well-established 
tradition at the University of Copenhagen, EU legal methods are enriched 
in interdisciplinary approaches. For this reason, actions and policies in 
areas wrongly perceived as ancillary to the integration of the market, 
should not be marginalised in a coherent theoretical framework.  1  
In this paper I select two main areas of reflection, starting from 
the observation that the economic and financial crisis has shaken the 
order of legal sources, raising issues of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability for all institutional actors.  
In a first step I look at the current state of EU social dialogue, one 
of the most original features in the evolution of market integration, 
according to Jacques Delors’ early intuitions, and not extraneous to the 
construction of a monetary union, as indicated in the Werner Plan.2  I 
follow this route in order to show that the lack of political consensus, 
accentuated by the crisis, caused a decline in the law-making process 
(articles 154-155 TFEU) and limited the quasi-institutional role of the 
social partners. Other processes were expanded, among all the European 
Semester, in which the social partners were not involved, as they should 
have been.  
I then observe some changes taking place in employment policies, 
which confirm the decline of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
In a second step I look at the impact of austerity measures on 
fundamental social rights. The European Semester deals with an ex ante 
examination of Member States performances and attempts to rationalise 
ex post consequences. Recommendations sent to national governments 
follow a path not comparable to the regulatory technique enshrined in 
Title IX TFEU, despite the fact that they often interact with employment 
policies. Furthermore, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), agreed 
by Euro area Member States, gave rise to a complex procedure, to be 
initiated by the country experiencing serious economic instability. 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), signed by the Troika and the 
                                                        
1 U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen (eds), European legal method. Towards a New European Legal 
Realism, Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2013, in which mention is made of all previous 
books in a series covering an overarching interdisciplinary research field. 
2 Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of Economic and 
Monetary Union in the Community - "Werner Report" - (definitive text) [8 October 1970], 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11/1970. 
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Member States concerned to grant financial support (art. 13.3 ESM), 
reiterated controversial emergency measures. The effects caused by all 
these manoeuvres are now under the scrutiny of courts and international 
organizations and reveal a fragmented picture, both in the choice of 
litigation and in the results to be achieved. Decoupling economic 
governance from respect of individual and collective social rights can give 
rise to infringements of art. 2 TEU, art. 9 TFEU, and of relevant articles in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).  New experiments in social law 
are in need of careful evaluation. The state of emergency cannot justify 
renouncing the rule of law.  
2. First step: EU social law despite the crisis  
There is urgency to contextualise social law in a theoretical 
framework, which also reflects an historical appraisal of the space 
covered by social policies in the EU. Historical reconstructions are 
controversial and commentators are divided. Wolfgang Streeck, for 
example, in a recent book in which he draws on arguments previously 
developed,3 puts forward a history of defeats, started in the Nineteen 
Seventies, when – as he claims – the European post-war settlement fell 
apart.  
A very weak resilience of national states to the reformulation of 
social policies imposed by EU institutions and a growing rate of 
unemployment shows, in his view, the lack of centrality of trade unions in 
representing collective interests. A concrete confirmation of this negative 
trend is the fading away of centralised bargaining on wages, which runs 
parallel to the increase in public debt. Hence the transformation of the 
fiscal state in a debtor state, in which wage policies do not counteract the 
introduction of a single currency. Social partners are portrayed in 
Streeck’s analysis as actors not well equipped to defend the autonomy of 
collective bargaining and to strengthen it against recurring interferences 
of EU institutions.  
Jürgen Habermas has criticised Streeck’s ‘nostalgic’ attitude, 
pointing to the paradox that going back to nation states would imply 
demolishing all that has been built in terms of democracy and 
constitutional norms at supranational level. 4  His plea for solidarity, 
passionately circulated through recent writings and expressly addressed 
                                                        
3 W. Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. New York, London: 
Verso Books 2014. 
4  J. Habermas, Demokratie oder kapitalismus? Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen 
Fragmentierung in einer Kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft,Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 5 (2013), pp. 59-70. 
English version available at http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022337. 
4   SILVANA SCIARRA 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 108/2014 
as a response to Streeck’s latest book, is very close to the voices of those 
European social lawyers, who are critically considering the devastating 
impact of the crisis, while attempting to rebuild a system of rights.5  
Even before the explosion of the crisis, a CJEU’s controversial case 
law, originated by Viking and Laval, brought into the public eye the 
dramatic phenomenon of social dumping. Apart from blaming this 
practice, the emphasis can retrospectively be placed on short-sighted 
forecasts by groups representing organised interests and on the lack of a 
clear-cut social policy orientation in secondary legislation.  A partial 
answer is now in the compromise reached under the Greek Presidency to 
reinforce the Directive on posting of workers in the free provision of 
services.6 Member States should be able to impose to service providers 
requirements and control measures, which are deemed strictly necessary. 
In the construction sector, subcontracting liability will apply for posted 
workers with regard to pay. 7  Meanwhile, national legislatures are 
introducing measures going even further than the new enforcement 
Directive.8 This issue will need to be further discussed at a supranational 
level and framed within additional measures to overcome the crisis, 
taking into account the potentialities of EU social dialogue even in this 
field. 
Contemporary discussions related to the crisis pay a lot of 
attention to wage bargaining. It can be disputed that the Euro Plus Pact 
interfered with national collective bargaining, when it recommended that 
increases in wages should be linked to productivity and should be dealt 
with at a decentralised level. 9   Even more problematic are the 
circumstances, which brought the ECB to surpass its own competence, 
addressing letters to national governments affected by serious economic 
                                                        
5 N. Countouris, M. Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe in a time of crisis, Cambridge: 
CUP 2013. 
6 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative 
co-operation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), [2014] 
OJ L 159/11. 
7 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/141319.pdf. 
8 Most lately cf. for example in France the so-called ‘Savary’ law, which – at the time I am 
writing – is under parliament’s approval procedure, http://www.vie-
publique.fr/actualite/panorama/texte-discussion/proposition-loi-visant-renforcer-
responsabilite-maitres-ouvrage-donneurs-ordre-cadre-sous-traitance-lutter-contre-
dumping-social-concurrence-deloyale.html and http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-
doc/FranceDiplomatie/PDF/baen2014-03-07.pdf. 
9 The committments under the Euro Plus Pact are expressed in Annex 1 of the European 
Council Conclusions of 24/25 March 2011, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf. 
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instability, arguing for wage moderation, the decentralization of collective 
bargaining and labour market reforms.10  
In different ways EU institutions aimed at controlling wage policies 
and reducing autonomous spaces for national bargaining agents. This is a 
counterintuitive model for a large part of European labour law 
scholarship, which built on collective autonomy its own post war identity. 
Voices of democratic groups representing collective interests were heard 
as a response to authoritarian regimes, 11  or as a confirmation of 
‘countervailing powers’ connected to a well established practice of 
collective bargaining, resistant against state interference.12    
Entering the sphere of wage bargaining is also in potential breach 
of ‘collective autonomy’, namely the autonomy of the social partners, as 
it is now enshrined in EU primary law (art. 152 TFEU, art. 28 CFR). These 
sources indicate very clearly that the exclusion of competences in the 
Treaty for matters such as pay and freedom of association do not impede 
the initiative of autonomous collective organizations. In other words, 
autonomy as an expression of a fundamental right – the right to 
associate and bargain collectively – prevails as a principle of EU law on 
the exclusions dealt with in art. 153.5 TFEU.  Hence, there is no legal 
basis in the Treaty to propose secondary law on excluded subject 
matters, but bargaining on any matter, based as it is on primary law, 
cannot be the object of interferences by EU institutions.    
2.1 European social dialogue   
Within this critical scenario it is instructive to test how the social 
partners respond and how collective autonomy in the EU can be 
considered an essential part of a constitutional theory. When national 
systems of collective bargaining, badly affected by the crisis, are 
confronted with low wages and poverty traps, supranational bargaining 
                                                        
10 K. Tuori, K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge: CUP, 2014, 
p. 102 ff. See also D. Tega, Welfare rights in Italy, in C. Kilpatrick, B. De Witte (eds.), 
Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ 
Challenges, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2014/05, pp. 51-52, and M.L. 
Rodríguez, Labour rights in crisis in the Eurozone: the Spanish case, in C. Kilpatrick, B. De 
Witte (eds.), cit., pp. 108-109.  
11  Italy and Spain are two interesting, albeit different, examples. See S. Sciarra, The 
‘Autonomy’ of Private Governments. Building on Italian Labour Law Scholarship in a 
Transnational Perspective, in A. Numhauser-Henning, M. Ronnmar (eds), Normative 
Patterns and Legal Developments in the Social Dimension of the EU, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing; S. Sciarra, G. Cazzetta, Un ‘puente doctrinal’. Scienza giuridica ed evoluzione 
del diritto del lavoro. Intervista a Miguel Rodriguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer, in Quaderni 
fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 2013, p. 739 ff. 
12 O. Kahn Freund, Labour and the Law, London: Stevens, 1972; Lord Wedderburn, The 
worker and the law, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986 (III edition). 
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follows different paths. A few examples of the latest outcomes, within the 
so-called sector social dialogue, 13  prove that European collective 
autonomy can take imaginative routes even in the difficult times we are 
experiencing.  
The social partners in air transport have been successful in 
influencing European institutions on changes to be made in existing 
Regulations,14 in order to adopt the ‘home base’ criterion as the only one 
in determining applicable legislation for flight crew and cabin 
crewmembers.  This measure aims at fighting social dumping and 
creating legal certainty in a very critical area of transport, in which 
litigation has been recurring in the last few years.   
In the social dialogue committee for Central government 
administrations a framework agreement was signed. It sets 20 
commitments to update Protocol n. 26 on Services of general interest, in 
compliance with the fundamental right to good administration and in 
response to budgetary constraints during the crisis.15 
Finally, European social partners in the temporary agency sector 
have prompted better cooperation between private and public 
employment agencies, to become pivotal in employment policies and 
obtained in a very short time the proposal for a Regulation. 16  
Measures originated by sector social dialogue are not extraneous 
to the crisis, as much as they may appear a detour from other more 
relevant issues. They often refer – as in the examples I selected – to 
matters of broad institutional relevance.  
 
 
                                                        
13 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford: OUP, 2012 (II edition), pp. 238-241 devotes 
attention to these autonomous practices. See also A. Jobert (ed), Les nouveaux cadres du 
dialogue social, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lange, 2008; S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, European 
social dialogue and transnational framework agreements as a response to the crisis? Policy 
Brief – European Social Policy 4, ETUI, Brussels 2011. 
14 Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems 
and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004, OJ L 149, 8.6.2012. 
15   The text of the agreement is accessible at www.epsu.org/r/569; see also 
www.cesi.org/index.html. 
16  In 2012 Eurociett and Unieuropa global union, the social partners in the temporary 
agency sector carried on a project on labour market transitions in Europe and produced 
recommendations to EU policy makers. See European Commission, Social Europe, 
Newsletter n. 5, January 2014, p. 90-92. The Commission has proposed a Regulation, based 
on art 46 TFEU, which should facilitate labour mobility through EURES.  See COM (2014) 6 
final 2014/0002 (COD), 17.1.2014. 
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2.2 A network of Public Employment Services. From 
harmonization to co-operation 
Improved labour mobility through EURES, facilitated by sector 
social dialogue in the temporary agency sector, is complementary to 
another legal act. A recent Decision,17 having regard in particular to art. 
149 TFEU, creates a network of public employment services (PES) and 
assigns to this new supranational structure the task to support 
employment guidelines, referred to in art. 148.4 TFEU, until 31 December 
2020. Such a revisited form of co-operation should also facilitate 
initiatives within the Youth Guarantee scheme, 18  particularly for skills 
matching, labour mobility and transition from education and training to 
work. 
This mixture of sources deserves some attention. The diminished 
impact of Title IX on employment policies has shown the weak side of a 
EU legal method, which took for granted the propensity of national 
administrations to interact and enhance best practices. In the body of 
Title IX a new binding legal act has now been implanted. The Decision 
establishing the PES network is addressed to Member States and 
accompanied by an Annex on benchmarking indicators, which can be 
amended by delegated acts of the Commission (art. 290 TFEU). The 
delegation of powers is conferred to the Commission until 31 December 
2020, the established ‘expiring date’ of the PES system.  Albeit for a 
limited time, the Commission is once more in the driving seat, if we 
accept that benchmarking – or ‘bench-learning’, as another neologism 
suggests – is not a mere statistical exercise.  
The enhanced co-operation established under this Decision is 
different from the employment strategy, which nourished the OMC. This 
new partially revised method is targeted to provide new strength to 
employment policies in compliance with the agenda set in Europe 2020,19 
hence it expires at the end of 2020 and it concentrates on rather specific 
issues. Furthermore, projects developed by the network should have 
access to funding from the European Social Fund (ESF), the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Horizon 2020. It is worth 
emphasising that this new co-operation requires very technical expertise.  
                                                        
17 Decision No 573/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on enhanced co-operation between Public Employment Services (PES), OJ L 159/32, 
28.5.2014. 
18 Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee, OJ C 120, 
26.04.2013, p. 1–6. 
19 Communication from the Commission of 3 March 2010, Europe 2020: A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. 
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However, that expertise should be finalised towards a political 
aim, namely to bring to the surface and to privilege employment policies 
in specific fields, as an answer to the dramatic impact of the crisis. 
Therefore, the selection of those who will become members of the 
network should mirror the competence of state administrations politically 
responsible for actions to be taken. Furthermore, this co-operation should 
aim at a fair distribution of funding. Employment policies in the wake of 
the crisis are meaningless without well-targeted financial support.  From 
now to 2020 a new cooperative federalism, based on policies of social 
inclusion and support for the weakest groups hit by the crisis and 
marginalised in national labour markets, could emerge from the 
disillusion of employment policies under OMC. 
Rearrangements, taking place in social and employment law 
sources, reveal a shift from harmonization to co-operation. The core 
nature of governance is changing, as a consequence of the crisis.20 The 
creation of an ad hoc specialised network of employment services could 
impoverish the role of the Employment Committee, which should operate 
in consultation with management and labour (art. 150 TFEU) and could 
even more contribute to de-politicise the deliberative process. However, if 
we take a constructive view, this new technical structure could profitably 
become the emanation of well-defined political decisions, should the 
Council adopt in the future clear-cut positions on employment and 
coordinate them within its different configurations. This should be part of 
reformed economic governance in the EU. 
I mentioned before that emergency decisions to be taken during 
the crisis have increased the difficulty to gather political consensus 
around legislative proposals and have weakened the harmonisation of 
social policies.  EU institutions are adjusting the legal methods enshrined 
in Chapters IX and X, exactly at the time when they lack the necessary 
accountability to do so. Changes should, on the contrary, be brought to 
the public attention in a more transparent way. 
A reduced impact of harmonization as a regulatory technique 
leads to the adoption of ‘quality frameworks’. Two recent examples are 
directly relevant for the discussion on measures to boost employment as 
a reaction to the crisis.  One is the Youth Guarantee, based on art. 292 
TFEU, dealing with a ‘good-quality offer of employment, continuous 
                                                        
20 K. Armstrong, Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium Law, 
in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, P. Larouche (eds.), The Constitutionalization of European 
Budgetary Constraints, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 65 ff. 
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education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within a period of four 
months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education’.21  
The other example is the Recommendation on traineeship, based 
on art. 153 of TFEU’s Social Policy chapter. Adopted in response to the 
Annual Growth Survey 2014,22 this source is characterised by the intent 
to improve transparency and to encourage the conclusion of written 
agreements for the definition of educational objectives, working 
conditions and a reasonable duration of traineeships.  
The noteworthy detail in both Recommendations is the 
encouragement addressed to Member States to make use of European 
Funds, namely the ESF and the ERDF, and to seek for technical 
assistance from the EU.  Actions to facilitate access to employment, 
particularly when they enter the dramatic dimension of youth 
unemployment are meaningless without financial support from the EU. 
For too long this synergy has been under evaluated, but it cannot be 
ignored in the current discussion. 
2.3 The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment 
The space of deliberative democracy emerging from EU sector 
social dialogue despite being partial is, nevertheless, supported by 
criteria of representativeness and legitimacy of the social partners. These 
criteria, unlike for other deliberative processes, are established in a 
Decision addressed to the social partners.23  Hence, the point can be 
made that a binding EU legal act has generated the practice of sector 
social dialogue, which enforces the fundamental right to collective 
bargaining. Primary and secondary EU law are supportive to autonomous 
collective autonomy. While all this takes place in the area of social 
dialogue, the procedure provided for in articles 154 and 155 TFEU, to 
pursue legislative initiatives in social policy, suffers from a declining 
political consensus.24 
                                                        
21 Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee, OJ C 120, 
26.4.2013, whereas (5). 
22 Council recommendation of 10 March 2014 on Quality Framework for Traineeships, OJ C 
88/1, 27.3.2014. Harsh criticism has been expressed by youth organisations 
http://www.youthforum.org/pressrelease/joint-letter-condemning-council-recommendation-
on-quality-framework-for-traineeships/. 
23  Commission Decision 98/500 CE of 20 May 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral 
Dialogue Committees promoting the Dialogue between the social partners at European 
level, OJ L 225/27, 20.05.1998. Empirical research is referred to in E. Léonard, E. Perin, P. 
Pochet, The European Sectoral Social Dialogue: Questions of Representation and 
Membership, in 42 Industrial relations Journal 2011, p.254 ff. 
24  For example, failure to adopt legislation on restructuring, after lengthy investigations into 
this area caused a complaint by ETUC to the European Ombudsman, following a previous 
initiative of the European Parliament, as for Art. 225 TFEU, namely the formal request to 
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One further contradiction to highlight is the imperfect composition 
of the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment, which 
includes representatives of employers and labour. The specific 
composition of this Council 25  can be considered an anomaly, when 
compared with other Council’s ‘configurations’ indicated in art. 16.6 TEU. 
The Commission seems now aware of this and is proposing a more visible 
role of the tripartite summit within the overall architecture of economic 
governance.26 It is, in fact, hard to deny that employment and growth 
constitute essential elements of macroeconomic strategies.  
In the attempt to facilitate coordination of policies and set targets 
within specific deadlines, the European Semester has progressively 
ignored the involvement of social partners. The strengthened economic 
governance program, part of the Stability and Growth Pact, incorporates 
the so-called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, in order to detect 
problems at an early stage. The instrument adopted by the Commission 
is the Alert Mechanism Report, which, at the beginning of the fourth 
European Semester in November 2013, brought the Commission to the 
screening of all Member States, on the basis of a scoreboard of 
indicators.27 But social rights were not part of that assessment, despite 
the Commission’s declared intention to strengthen the social dimension of 
economic governance. 
In a Resolution, followed by specific Recommendations to the 
Council,28 the EP acknowledges critically its own limited involvement and 
develops a detailed critique of the European Semester. Social indicators, 
unlike in the Macroeconomic imbalance procedure scoreboard, are not 
binding. They are inadequate, in particular with regard to inequalities due 
                                                                                                                                               
‘submit any appropriate proposal’ on matters relevant for the implementation of the Treaty, 
http://petition.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/ETUC complaint to EU Ombudsman on European 
Commission.  
25 Council Decision 2003/174/CE of 6 March 2003 establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for 
Growth and Employment, OJ L 70/31,14.3.2003. It can be worth to recall that in European 
Council Decision 2010/594 EU of 16 September 2010, OJ L 263/12, 6.10.2010, amending 
the configuration of the Council to reflect changes provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, no 
mention is made of the Tripartite Social Summit. 
26  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Strengthening the Social Dimension of the economic and monetary union, of 2 October 
2013, 690 (2013) final, 14.  The EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, in its 
Motion for a Resolution of 6 January 2014, 2013/0361 (APP) suggested to expand even 
further the competences of the Summit. 
27  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/documents/2014-03-05 in 
depth_reviews_com 
munication_en.pdf.  
28  European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2014 on the European Semester for 
economic policy coordination: Employment and Social Aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 
2014 (2013/2158(INI)). 
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to lowering wages and in-job poverty. Wage increases are not sufficiently 
encouraged, despite the beneficial impact they could have in increasing 
propensity to spending.29 The EP also underlines a critical unbalance and 
lack of coordination among Ecofin, on the one hand, and Employment 
and social affaires council meetings, on the other.   
The EP stigmatizes institutional imbalances – for example the lack 
of coordination among different configurations of the Council – as a 
consequence of the exceedingly strong position assigned to the 
Commission, seen as the leading actor in running the show of the 
European semester. The criticism raised by ETUC runs along similar lines. 
30 Furthermore, a recent study 31 shows the contradictions emerging from 
the implementation of austerity measures. The largest cuts in social 
spending took place in countries with a high risk of poverty and social 
exclusion. Limitations put on public spending prevailed on measures for 
social inclusion and no attention was paid to the increasing level of 
poverty among working people. All these missed opportunities in further 
enhancing social law demonstrate that inequalities among weak groups in 
the labour market are the prevailing outcomes of current economic 
governance. 
There is enough evidence to prove that the European Semester 
does not interact in a constructive way with social dialogue and in some 
cases puts severe limits to it. However, if we look at the implantation of 
social dialogue in EU primary law and in the practice of EU social 
partners, the indication is that there are ways to pursue democratic forms 
of collective interests representation. The auspice for the future is to 
expand social dialogue even further, with a view to creating a legal 
framework for transnational agreements signed by large multinationals 
operating within the EU and by European sector and cross-sector 
federations. This practice, yet another imaginative expression of 
collective autonomy, is increasingly expanding inside and outside the 
EU.32   
 
                                                        
29 See, for instance, Building growth: Country-specific recommendations 2014, Commission 
Press Release, IP/14/623, 6.2.2014. 
30 http://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-position-european-commission-communication-
strengthening-social-dimension-economic#.U2-wFyidSbk. 
31 ETUI, Benchmarking Working Europe 2014, Brussels: ETUI aisbl., 2014. 
32 S. Sciarra, M. Fuchs, A Sobczak, Towards a legal framework for transnational company 
agreements , Report to the ETUC, with the support of the European Commission DG 
Employment, Brussels 2013, http://www.etuc.org/ documents/etuc-resolution-proposal-
optional-legal-framework-transnational-negotiations-multinational#.U4I M1SidSbk., I. 
Schömann et al., Transnational collective bargaining at company level, ETUI, Brussels 2012. 
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3. Second step: the role of international and EU law  
In taking the first step, I started from the legal preconditions 
allowing some expansion of social law despite the crisis. In social law I 
have included social dialogue, a clear manifestation of the fundamental 
right to collective bargaining. I now turn to austerity measures affecting 
social law, both at national and supranational levels. 
   The negative impact of the crisis has been visible in all countries 
of the EU, albeit with varying degrees of infiltration within welfare and 
labour law systems.33 Austerity measures dealing with fundamental social 
rights also affect institutional balances, whenever they come into collision 
with EU law. The route chosen by different actors to challenge austerity 
measures, relying on ILO34 and Council of Europe sources, while at the 
same time sending preliminary references to the CJEU, is an indisputable 
sign of the widespread fear that democracy and the rule of law are being 
threatened.  
It has been suggested that a ‘legitimacy dilemma’ lies behind 
fiscal and economic policies adopted in the EU. 35  The option to de-
politicise choices and solutions to be taken as a response to the crisis can 
go into the direction of applying specialised and technical expertise, 
instead of strengthening political deliberations. The state of emergency 
ends up justifying the abandonment of a European legal method.  This 
analysis is confirmed by the examples I gave above. 
In this process social law is the ‘eternal loser’.36 The voice of the 
Commission, in the attempt to offer answers, is fragmentary and not too 
coherent. Proposals, such as the ones discussed before dealing with the 
reform of the European Semester and of economic governance, do not 
seem to reach the core problems. The lack of political consensus in the 
Council jeopardizes legislative initiatives in the social field and gives rise 
to all sorts of weak experimental solutions. Social law should instead offer 
valid countermeasures in the wake of the crisis and at least limit 
concerns among those who see their entitlements to fundamental rights 
shaken if not diminished. 
                                                        
33 M.-C. Escande Varniol, S. Laulom, E. Mazuyer (eds.), Quel droit social dans une Europe 
en crise?, Brussels: Larcier, 2012; Z. Darvas, G. B. Wolff, Europe’s social problem and its 
implications for economic growth, Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/3, April 2014, 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/823-europes-social-
problem-and-its-implications-for-economic-growth/. 
34 On austerity measures and ILO sources see for example A. Koukiadaki, L. Kretsos, The 
case of Greece, in M.-C. Escande Varniol, S. Laulom, E. Mazuyer (eds.), cit., fn n. 33, pp. 
199-200. 
35 K. Tuori, K. Tuori, cit., fn n. 10, p. 211. 
36 Ibid., p. 231. 
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In a recent study the evocative figure of a ‘triangular prism’ is 
suggested to connect the rule of law with democracy and fundamental 
rights in the EU.37 The study develops a critique of instruments, such as 
monitoring and benchmarking, used in the assessment of country 
performances, within the overall architecture of the European Semester. 
The marginal role of the EP is also stigmatised and seen as yet another 
sign of weak democratic legitimacy. A way of controlling the enforcement 
of art. 2 TEU by Member States – it is suggested – is in art. 7 TEU.  
Art. 7, added in 1997 by the Amsterdam Treaty to the TEU to 
provide a monitoring mechanism for countries of enlargement, is situated 
by the authors at the centre of a discussion on austerity measures, which 
have affected in different ways a large number of Member States.  That 
Treaty amendment has not coincided with reinvigorated human rights 
policies within the EU, notwithstanding the establishment of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency. Nevertheless, it could still play a significant 
role in a new and perhaps stronger strategy. 
Issues related to the breach of social rights are not specifically 
addressed in this study, but the critique of surveillance mechanisms 
within the scheme of the European Semester developed by the authors is 
applicable to social policies, which are an integral part of economic 
manoeuvres.  However, actions for the prevention of violations in the 
national textures of fundamental rights were not put in place by means of 
existing EU instruments in the bailout countries, nor in other countries 
coming under the scrutiny of EU institutions. The point to make clear, in 
fact, is that all different sources adopted in the aftermath of the crisis 
generate parallel discussions on breaches of fundamental rights.  
A survey focused on MoUs, which, as already mentioned are 
negotiated by the Troika and the countries required to adopt austerity 
measures, is developed in a ‘legal opinion’ commissioned to the Bremen 
centre of European law and Politics (ZERP).38 References in this study are 
to infringements of EU law and to responses found in a systematic 
interpretation of international law sources, with an aim to expanding the 
scope of protection of fundamental rights and establishing 
responsibilities. The underlying allegation is that a state of emergency 
cannot lead to suspending the rule of law, nor can affect the foundations 
                                                        
37 S. Carrera, E. Guild, N. Hernanz, The triangular relationship between fundamental rights, 
democracy and the rule of law in the EU. Towards an EU Copenhagen mechanism, Study 
commissioned by the EP Committee on Civil liberties, Justice and Home affairs, CEPS 2013. 
38 A. Fisher Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy. The EU institutions and the 
conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding, Bremen 17 February 2014. The opinion was 
commissioned by the Vienna chamber of labour, in cooperation with the Austrian trade 
union federation, ETUC, ETUI. 
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of democracy. Troika is not accountable in international law, but the ECB 
and the Commission are. The latter have acted as EU institutions in the 
crisis and must be considered responsible for breaches of fundamental 
rights ex art. 6 TEU. Their obligation is at the same time towards Member 
States and citizens.39  
Proposals put forward in this legal opinion try to respond back to 
the disillusion generated by austerity measures among EU citizens and to 
the serious attacks perpetrated to States’ sovereignty. A systematic 
interpretation of all EU and international law sources, with a view to 
creating a safety net around fundamental rights, must, nonetheless, take 
into account the very weak position of individuals affected by MoUs and 
the uneven capacity of organised groups to pursue strategic litigations.  
Results can be very fragmented, as it appears from the analysis of 
national cases.40  In a preliminary reference, which is still pending, the 
Tribunal do Trabalho do Porto in Portugal asks the CJEU to evaluate 
whether the right to equal treatment has been breached, following wage 
cuts in the public sector, required by the 2012 budget law.  It is argued, 
with reference to art 31.1 CFR, which guarantees fair working conditions, 
that fair wages should also be protected, to avoid the undermining of 
families’ stability. 41 The CJEU had declined a similar reference, coming 
from the same court, since it ‘did not contain any concrete element 
allowing to infer that the Portuguese law was aiming to apply Union law’. 
42 The interaction among courts is further complicated by the views of the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court. Ruling on a complaint filed by some 
members of Parliament, the Court decided that the 2011 budget law was 
not in violation of the right to equal treatment, since measures addressed 
to the public sector were in line with the agreements signed with the 
Commission and the IMF, which assigned more sacrifices to civil servants. 
The latter are regarded as citizens more observant than others towards 
the public common good.  In 2012 the Court ruled differently on wage 
cuts – holidays and Christmas allowances – highlighting the increased 
hardship imposed on citizens and the unfairness in sharing sacrifices. 43 
In 2013 the Constitutional Court was asked to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the 2013 budget law, this time on a complaint filed by 
the President of the Republic, Members of Parliament and the 
                                                        
39 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
40 A wide-ranging and deep analysis of national cases in C. Kilpatrick e B. De Witte (eds), 
cit., fn n. 10. 
41 CJEU, Case C-264/12, Sindacato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros, pending.  
42 CJEU, Case C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte, [2013] ECR nyr. 
43 J. Gomes, Social rights in crisis in the Eurozone. Work rights in Portugal, in C. Kilpatrick, 
B. De Witte (eds.), cit., fn n. 10, p. 81. 
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Ombudsman. Despite the fact that the economic conditions had not 
drastically changed from the previous budget law, the Court found that 
the equality principle had been breached, in assigning more sacrifices to 
civil servants. 44  In 2014 once more the Court ruled unconstitutional 
articles in the budget law introducing cuts to state sector workers who 
earned over a certain ceiling and reducing pensions and welfare 
benefits.45 
It is impossible to enter the technicalities of these decisions, which 
have attracted a lot of attention and will continue to do so, waiting for the 
CJEU’s ruling, still to be delivered. They prove, once more, how difficult it 
is to establish equilibrium between the judiciary and the lawmakers in the 
wake of the crisis. Despite all these uncertainties in the judicial arena, 
Portugal is a success story for the Troika, since in the last three years the 
country regained both international credibility and financial stability, 
ending the bailout program.46 However, there are a few clouds in this 
sky, if one considers that, despite welfare and wage cuts so unevenly 
distributed, unemployment remains very high. If Portugal was to be 
taken as a paradigm, the EU institutions should now enter a post 
emergency phase and activate supportive social measures. A different 
dialogue should start with the same actors – be they judges or members 
of parliament or civil society organizations – which fought back austerity 
measures, trying to keep alive democracy and the rule of law.  
In the Greek case other contradictions emerge. The European 
Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), following a collective complaint filed 
by Greek unions, decided for the discriminatory nature of lower wages 
paid to workers under 25 years and invited national courts not to apply 
national law. The same was suggested for measures degrading living 
conditions.  The Committee had to adopt a proportionality criterion and 
clearly stated that ‘measures taken to encourage greater employment 
flexibility with a view to combating unemployment should not deprive 
broad categories of employees of their fundamental rights in the field of 
labour law, which protect them against arbitrary decisions by their 
employers or the worst effects of economic fluctuations’. It also referred 
to the position taken by the Greek national commission for human rights, 
which had expressed  ‘the imperative need to reverse the sharp decline in 
                                                        
44 G. Coelho, P. Caro de Sousa, ‘La morte dei mille tagli’. Nota sulla decisione della Corte 
Costituzionale portoghese in merito alla legittimità del bilancio annuale 2013, in Giornale di 
diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali 2013, p. 527 ff. See also R. Cisotta e D. Gallo in C. 
Kilpatrick, B. De Witte (eds.), cit.,  fn n. 10, pp. 90-94. 
45  Tribunal Constitutional de Portugal, Acórdão nº 413/2014 of 30.5.2014; 
http://euobserver.com/news/124434. 
46 Il Sole 24 ore, 6 May 2014. 
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civil liberties and social rights’.47 This citation shows that the domestic 
alert mechanism, assigned to a body in charge of guaranteeing 
compliance with human rights, was not taken into consideration by the 
legislature, constrained within the scheme of the MoU, which took 
precedence as an emergency measure.48 
The language of the ECSR in another case filed by Greek trade 
unions is even more specific, when it addresses the cumulative impact of 
austerity measures as a criterion to evaluate the breach of social security 
rights. The arguments brought by the Committee are once more 
illuminating as for the role that should be assigned to ex ante empirical 
examinations of the overall impact of emergency decisions. The point 
made is that ‘the Government has not conducted the minimum level of 
research and analysis into the effects of such far-reaching measures, that 
is necessary to assess in a meaningful manner their full impact on 
vulnerable groups in society.’ And ‘(n)either has it discussed the available 
studies with the organisations concerned, despite the fact that they 
represent the interests of many of the groups most affected by the 
measures at issue’. 49 
The results of judicial activism and social mobilisation in countries 
badly hit by austerity measures deserve careful evaluation. The ECSR in 
particular has developed very relevant legal analysis, which should be 
now considered by the EU institutions as a starting point for a new 
strategy in social law. The non-binding nature of this Committee’s 
decisions does not obscure the moral value that should be attached to 
them. Labour standards should be restated as a clear response to the 
detrimental effects of the crisis. 
4. An institutional disorder. Some concluding remarks 
A plea for solidarity, in response to sceptic and nostalgic views on 
the future of the EU, entails the construction of stronger supranational 
institutions, transparently empowered in redistributing resources and in 
reconstructing clear links of representation. Measures dictated by the 
crisis have, on the contrary, changed the nature of states’ competences 
                                                        
47  ECSR, General federation of employees of the national electric power corporation 
(GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v. Greece, 
Complaint n. 66/2011, Decision on the merits of 23.5.2012.  Comments in K. Tuori , K. 
Tuori, cit., fn n.10, p. 239. 
48 See M. Yannakourou and C. Tsimpoukis ,Flexibility without security and deconstruction of 
collective bargaining. The new paradigm of labour law in Greece, in 35 Comparative Labour 
Law and Policy Journal 2014, p. 339 ff. 
49 ECSR, Federation of employed pensioners of Greece (IKA- ETAM) v. Greece, Complaint n. 
76/2012, Decision on the merits of 7.12.2012. 
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in recognising specific entitlements both to individuals and collective 
organizations and have not fully clarified under which conditions weaker 
groups in the labour market will be the addressees of supportive 
measures.  
    The examples offered in this paper show an institutional 
disorder, which has been provoked by recourse to emergency measures 
of different nature and weight.  Social law has been taken as a test case, 
with special regard to the functions traditionally assigned to the social 
partners, re-invented despite the crisis. One point to make is that 
attempts to regain social emancipation in the countries most affected by 
austerity measures have been made by trade unions and other collective 
organizations. In such a way new inequalities and serious exclusions from 
basic welfare services have emerged and now are being discussed in the 
public sphere. 
    The crucial point is how to recover from the institutional 
disorder, disclosed by these new forms of judicial activism and social 
protest. ‘The shift from legislation to contract’ 50 clearly underlined with 
references to present institutional circumstances, shows the many risks 
inherent in negotiations undertaken in a state of emergency. Hence, 
there is an urgent need to regain space for legislation inspired by the 
fundamental values of the EU. We should recall that solidarity is a source 
of social integration, besides money and administrative power. In this 
perspective EU legislation should re-assign entitlements to individuals 
and to groups representing collective interests and should do so with full 
respect for democracy and the rule of law. 51 
                                                        
50  P. Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and 
Constitutional Implications, in  M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, P. Larouche (eds.), cit., fn n. 20, p. 
29. 
51 J. Habermas, cit., fn. n. 4. See also J. Habermas, Between facts and norms, Postscript 
(1994), Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 449 ff. 
